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Abstract:
The paper proposes an economic and cultural mechanism that can predict a fertility
transition and its timing. The cultural structure of the population is endogenously deter-
mined by a cultural evolution mechanism. The fertility rates reduction in the long run is
always the result of an interaction between the cultural and economic structures of the soci-
ety. Permanent productivity schocks have to distort su¢ ciently the cultural structure of the
population to make acceptable modern behaviours (in term of fertility) to the traditionalist
parents. An increase in the average income level provoked by the technological progress will
be necessary but not su¢ cient condition to undergo a fertility transition. Finally, a fertility
transition can always appear in the economy wathever the initial cultural structure but that
cultural structure determines the timing of the transition.
Résumé:
Le papier propose un mécanisme économique et culturel qui peut prédire une baisse à
long terme du taux moyen de fécondité et son timing. La structure culturelle de la popula-
tion est endogène et déterminée par un processus dévolution culturelle. La baisse du taux
moyen de fécondité à long terme est toujours le résultat dune interaction entre les struc-
tures économiques et culturelles de la société. Des chocs de productivité permanents doivent
su¢ samment distordre la structure culturelle an de rendre acceptable les comportements
modernes de fécondité aux agents traditionalistes. Une hausse du niveau de revenu moyen
via les chocs de productivité sera une condition nécessaire mais non su¢ sante pour quune
transition démographique puisse apparaître. Enn, une transition démographique pourra
toujours apparaître, quelque soit la structure culturelle initiale. Cependant, cette structure
culturelle initiale détermine lampleur des chocs de productivité nécessaires.
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1 Introduction
Explaining the fertility transition is not a novel topic. Economists and demographers pro-
vided some relevant theories in this eld. The fertility transition can be dened as the
transition from a traditional high birth rate regime to a modern low birth rate regime. From
an economic viewpoint, at least two main explanations can be distinguished. Firstly, the
beckerian costs advantages analysis shows that a trade-o¤ between quantity and quality of
children desired by parents can be induced by a change in the relative cost (or e¢ ciency)
of education and children rearing. Secondly, a risk analysis of fertility behaviours demon-
strates that a children mortality variation can explain the fertility changes by a risk e¤ect.
According to Sah [1991] and Kalemli-Ozcan [2002], parents determine their optimal number
of surviving children but rationally overshoot it because they forsee the die of some child
born. The part of dead children is randomly determined by the children mortality rate, then
the parental precaution demand for children increases with the children mortality.
Demographers and anthropologists propose some other explanations. An important one
is the inuence of culture and traditions on fertility choices. People belong to some cultural
groups that embody specic norms and traditions directly a¤ecting their economic behaviour.
That impact has been highlighted by demographic and econometric studies.
Economists recently explored that phenomenon with econometric studies that directly
measure the impact of traditions and religion (which are considered as good proxies for
culture) on economic performance and sometimes especially on fertility behaviours2. Hacker
[1999] shows that the degree of christian conservatism (measured by a dummy variable
indicating wether individual belong to special religious groups such as Congregationalists,
2Note that in a macroeconomic perspective Max Weber paved the way with his "The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism". Barro and Mc Cleary [2002] nd that economic growth responds positively to
the extent of some religious beliefs but negatively to church attendance in an international panel of countries.
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Universalists, Lutherans, Catholics...) is a good proxy for religion sentiment in the nineteenth
century American native white woman. He nds that this proxy have a signicant e¤ect on
the womens fertility: more conservatism implies a higher total fertility rate.
Fernandez and Fogli [2005] show that culture is important to two economic outcomes:
female work and fertility. They observe the economic behaviour of immigrants to the United
States during the second half of the twentieth century. They consider the expected female
labor force participation and their total fertility rate, for the year 1950 in the immigrants
country of origin, as a good proxy for culture. It reects their country cultural attitude
toward womens labor and fertility. They nd that the cultural proxy is an economically and
statistically signicant variable to explain women labor force participation and their total
fertility rate. This e¤ect remains robust after controlling for usual variables like income,
social background... and for the bias of unobservable human capital di¤erences and network
quality heterogeneity.
Janssen & Hauser [1981] study fertility behaviours in the Wisconsin in 1975. They use
a data set of seven thousand married people having children and being aged from 35 to 37.
Their total fertility rate is regressed on their human capital (years of scholarship, diploma),
their social background (job and human capital of their parents), their job status, their
farmer status (to be a farmer or not,...), their age at marriage, their score at a specic IQ
test and on their catholic status (to be catholic or not, to have a wife (husband) who is
catholic, to have catholic parents). Then, after having controlled for all known biais, they
nd that to be catholic have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the agents fertility. Catholics
have from 0,5 to 1 more children than the non catholics.
Regarding these evidences, the paper proposes a model where people are culturally het-
erogenous. Agents can belong to a traditional culture (not especially a religion) characterized
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by a high birth rate norm or to a modern culture (not especially the occidental one) charac-
terized by a low birth rate norm. Utility functions make costly a deviation from the fertility
norm of the group.
Furthermore the cultural structure of the population is not exogenous. It is the result
of an endogenous cultural evolution mechanism. To obtain such a mechanism, the theory of
endogenous preferences formation is employed. The paper especially follow the line of Bisin
and Verdier [2001] where preferences are acquired through some socialization mechanisms.
During the socialization process, parents try to transmit their preferences to their children
because they prefer to have children like them. That preference can be justied in many
ways.
Bergstrom [1994] explores the human evolutionnary history to analyse the family eco-
nomics. He highlights that sexual diploids give a higher value to the siblings characterized by
the same genetic trait as his own. He uses the Semi-Kantian Golden Rule for Sexual Diploid
Siblings and the Hamilton Rule: ""Act toward your sibling as would be in your own best
interest if with probability 1/2 your siblings action would mimic your own" (...). Hamiltons
rule implies that when faced with the option of sacricing c units of its own reproductive
success in order to increase the success of a relative whose coe¢ cient of relatedness is k,
by b units, the decision maker should make the sacrice if it passes the benet-cost test kb
> c". The Kantian Golden Rule implies that parents prefer to have non mutant children.
When parents can not immediately discriminate between mutant and non mutant children,
the Hamilton rule ensures that they take care of future mutant children if the probability
that one child is a mutant is strictly inferior to one3. So Bergstrom proposes an evolutionary
justication to the parental preference for children adopting their own trait.
3If the probability that a child is a mutant is one, parents do not take care of that child. They allocate
their ressources to related children of other families who are not mutant with probability one.
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Bisin & Verdier [2001] argue that parents prefer to have children adopting the same
preferences as their own by the paternalistic altruism theory. A paternalistic parent values
his children future behaviour through the lter of his own preferences. The optimal childrens
future behaviour maximizes the parental utility function only when these children have the
same preferences as their parents. Then parents make some altruistic e¤ort to transmit their
preferences to their children. So Bisin & Verdier proposes an argument of imperfect empathy
to justify the type of preferences used in this model.
In a sociological perspective, agents tend to be matched with other agents having the
same trait, then there exist some social costs to have children adopting a di¤erent trait, their
own social group punish them. A deviation from the norm of his social group is costly for a
parent.
As parents prefer to have children adopting the same preferences as their own, they make
a socialization e¤ort. The model uses a standard socialization process with two stages, as in
Bisin & Verdier [2001]. During the rst stage, parents make an e¤ort (et) to socialize their
child to their own trait. If they do not succeed, during a second stage of socialization, the
child is matched with an agent and adopt his trait.
In that framework, the fertility rates reduction in the long run is always the result of
an interaction between the cultural and economic structures of the society. Permanent
productivity shocks have to distort su¢ ciently the cultural structure of the population to
make acceptable modern behaviours (in term of fertility) to the traditionalist parents. An
increase in the wage gap between moderns and traditionalists level provoked by an asymetric
technological progress will be a necessary but not su¢ cient condition to undergo a fertility
transition. Finally, a fertility transition can always appear in the economy wathever the
cultural structure but that cultural structure determines the timing of the transition.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the rst section describes the structure of
the economy and the microeconomic behaviour of each type of agent in the population. The
second section analyzes the cultural and demographic dynamics of the economy. Finally the
results are discussed.
2 Description of the economy
2.1 The Economy Model
The model consists in an overlapping generation economy where there are Lt agents who live
for two periods. In the rst period they are children, they only receive education from their
parent and do not consume. In the second period they are adult, they choose their optimal
number of children Nt and their social education et (which is understood as the socialization
e¤ort that will be dened in the next section). Family are monoparental in order to simplify
the results. Childbearing is costly, each child implies a cost  > 0. The socialization cost is
noted  > 0:
Agents are culturally heterogenous in the sense that they could belong to di¤erent cultural
groups. There exist two cultures in the economy. The rst culture is the traditional one
and is characterized by a high fertility norm N and by a constant level of individual human
capital ht. The second culture is the modern one and is characterized by a low fertility
norm N and a x level of human capital hm 4. In order to reect the impact of culture
on microeconomic behaviours, a deviation from the group fertility norm will be costly. qt
represents the proportion of modern agents at the period t, then (1  qt) is the proportion
of traditional agents at that date.
A modern parent who has a modern child receives a payo¤ noted V mm; if he has a
traditional child, he receives V mt. A traditional parent who has a traditional child receives
4Note that the human capital levels are exogenous.
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V tt; if he has a modern child, he receives V tm. All things being equal, parents prefer to
have children adopting the same culture (trait) as their own but they altruistically prefer
that their children become rich. Their children future income is determined by their human
capital hm if they become modern and ht if they become traditionalist.
V mm = mm + wmhm
V mt = mt + wtht
V tt = tt + wtht
V tm = tm + wmhm
(1)
V m = mm   mt + wmhm   wtht represents the loss for a modern parent to have a
traditionalist child. V t = tt  tm  [wmhm   wtht] represents the loss for a traditionalist
parent to have a modern child. Note that parameters ij are such that V m  0 and
V t  0 8i; j:
The cultural trait a child will adopt is not exogenously determined, it is the result of
a socialization process where the cultural education, provided by the parent, is crucial. A
child is rst exposed to the familial socialization that succeeds with probability  (eit) such
that:

 
eit

=
8<:
0 if eit < 0
1  (1  eit)2 if 0 < eit < 1
1 if eit > 1
8i = m; t with  0  eit > 0;  00  eit < 0 (2)
The socialization e¤ort is costly, each familial socialization unit costs  > 0. It is con-
sidered as a public good in the family, when the parental e¤ort is e; each child have the
probability  (e) to adopt his parents trait. If the familial process fails, the child is en-
gaged in a second stage of socialization where he is randomly matched with a role agent in
the society and adopt his trait. With probability  (q) the child is matched with a mod-
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ern agent5 and with probability 1    (q) with a traditionalist agent.  (q) is such that
0 (q) > 0;  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1: The transition probabilities can be expressed as follows:
Pmm =  (emt ) + [1   (emt )] (qt)
Pmt = [1   (emt )] [1   (qt)]
P tt =  (emt ) + [1   (emt )] [1   (qt)]
P tm = [1   (emt )] (qt)
(3)
P ij 2 [0; 1] 8i; j, it represents the probability for a parent of type i to have a child of
type j. It appears that the probability for a child to become modern [traditionalist] increases
with the proportion of modern [traditionalist] agent in the economy.
Actually, there exist two instruments for traditionalists and moderns to ensure their
reproductive success in the long run: their fertility rates and their socialization e¤ort. With
a high fertility rate, a group ensures a large application of its socialization process. Then it
can make a lower socialization e¤ort per family to ensure the same reproductive success than
a group with a low fertility rate. Inversely, a group adopting a high socialization e¤ort per
family, needs a lower total fertility rate. The cultural dynamic of the economy is expressed
with the dynamic of qt :
qt+1   qt = qtN
m
t (1  qt   Pmt)  (1  qt)N tt (qt   P tm)
qtNmt + (1  qt)N tt
(4)
The demographic dynamic entirely depends on the cultural dynamic such that:
Lt+1   Lt
Lt
= qtN
m
t + (1  qt)N tt   1 (5)
The transition probabilities and the fertility levels crucially depends on the parental
microeconomic choices that are described in what follows.
5(q) is not necessarily equal to q , it allows to depict every type of social discrimination and domination.
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2.2 Microeconomic Choices
Following the precedent assumptions, the maximization program of a modern parent born
at period (t  1) is:
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Max
Nmt ;e
m
t
Wmt (N
m
t ; e
m
t ) =  12m (N  Nmt )2 + PmmV mm + PmtV mt
(st)
wmt h
m = Nmt + e
m
t
Pmm =  (emt ) + [1   (emt )] (qt)
Pmt = [1   (emt )] [1   (qt)]
m represents the coercitive power of the norm N into the modern group.  > 0 is the
quantity cost for each child born.  > 0 is the cost of the socialization e¤ort. The optimal
behaviour of modern parents is:
Nmt =
mN   2 [1   (qt)]V m 
h
1  wmt hm

i
m + 2 [1   (qt)]V m



2 (6)
emt =
1

0B@wmt hm   mN   2 [1   (qt)]V m 
h
1  wmt hm

i
m + 2 [1   (qt)]V m



2
1CA (7)
The optimal fertility choice of a modern parent increases with the fertility norm N and
with its coercitive power. V m can be understood as the modern parental intolerance that
is to say the loss for a modern parent to have a child who adopt the traditionalist culture.
An increase of V m consist in a higher expected loss per child born, then parents tend to
make less children and to implement a higher socialization e¤ort to reduce that expected
loss.
The socialization e¤ort decreases with the proportion of modern parents. The vertical
(parental) socialization and the oblique (second stage of) socialization are substitutes. When
10
the parental socialization fails, a child with modern parents still have a chance to become
modern if he is matched with a modern role agent in the society. When qt increases, the
probability for any child to be matched with a modern role model becomes higher. Then the
expected gain per child born increases and parents can reduce their own (costly) socialization
e¤ort and make more children.
An increase of the modern wage can be ambiguous. Parents are supposed to perfectly
anticipate the wage level of a future modern or traditionalist child. If a modern parent an-
ticipates that wm will increase for the next period, his expected loss per child born increases,
then he reduces his fertility rate and increases his socialization e¤ort.
However, if the modern wage increases for the modern parents and the future modern
children, two e¤ects are in balance. The higher expected loss e¤ect is still present but an
income e¤ect takes place. The income of modern parents increases, that incites them to
increase their socialization e¤ort and their fertility. Then the net impact of a rise in wm is
still positive on emt but is ambigous on N
m
t : It appears that for high values of w
m, the income
e¤ect becomes higher than the intolerance e¤ect, then the quantity of children increases.
In a symmetric way, the maximization program of a traditionalist parent is:
8>>><>>>:
Max
Ntt ;e
t
t
W tt (N
t
t ; e
t
t) =  12t
 
N  N tt
2
+ P ttV tt + P tmV tm
(st) wtth
t = N tt + e
t
t
P tt =  (ett) + [1   (ett)] (qt)
P tm = [1   (ett)] (qt)
The costs of fertility and socialization are the same for traditionalist parents and modern
parents. The optimal behaviour of traditionalist parents is symetric to the modern one:
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N tt =
tN   2 (qt)V t 
h
1  wttht

i
t + 2 (qt)V t



2 (8)
ett =
1

0B@wttht   tN   2 (qt)V t 
h
1  wttht

i
t + 2 (qt)V t



2
1CA (9)
The vertical and oblique socialization are still substitutes for traditionalists parents, then
an increase in qt incites them to make less children and to implement a higher socialization
e¤ort. A rise in wt have the same impact for traditionalist parents as an increase in wm for
modern parents.
A rise in wm reduces the expected loss of a traditionalist parent when his children become
modern because their future income gain will be higher. Then traditionalist parents become
less intolerant when their children adopt the modern culture. Actually they reduce their
socialization e¤ort and increase their fertility rate.
Following these microeconomic results, the cultural and demographic properties of the
economy can be analyzed.
3 Scenario for a fertility transition
3.1 Analytical results
The cultural dynamic of the population is given by equations (1) ; (3) ; (6) ; (7) ; (8) and (9) :
It follows, for interior solutions for equations (6) ; (7) ; (8) and (9) for the traditional and
modern programs, that:
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qt+1   qt = qt (1  qt) (N
m
t  N tt ) + (1  qt)N ttP tmt   qtNmt Pmtt
qtNmt + (1  qt)N tt
(10)
with :
N ttP
tm
t
 (qt)
=
tN 2(qt)V t 

1 w
t
th
t


t+2(qt)V t(  )
2 
 
1  1

"
wtth
t   
tN 2(qt)V t 

1 w
t
th
t


t+2(qt)V t(  )
2
#!2
Nmt P
mt
t
1   (qt) =
mN 2[1 (qt)]Vm 
h
1 w
m
t h
m

i
m+2[1 (qt)]Vm(  )
2 

1  1


wmt h
m   
mN 2[1 (qt)]Vm 
h
1 w
m
t h
m

i
m+2[1 (qt)]Vm(  )
2
2
This dynamics is non linear and very dependant on the parameters value, some interesting
properties appears. There always exist at least two steady states qt = f0; 1g; that comes
from the implemented socialization process: P tm = 0 when qt = 1 and Pmt = 0 when qt = 0:
It ensures that no "cultural mutation" can appear: if a trait is not represented in the society,
it will never be represented in the long run unless it is exogenously intoduced. These two
steady states are not necessary stable.
The non linearity of the dynamics implies that the number of steady states and their
stability crucially depend on the parameters values. No general result can be proposed ex-
cepted that bifurcations could appear. To obtain more tangible results, a calibration and
simulation exercise is proposed.
3.2 Numerical Results
A calibration and simulation exercise is proposed. The calibration values are given in appen-
dix 1.  (qt) is choosen to reect a social domination mechanism. The culture in majority
controls some strategic social instruments that make the child probability to be matched
with a role agent of the dominant culture greater than their proportion in the population.
 (qt) = q
3
t   32q2t + 32qt: It can be supposed that the dominant culture inuences the social-
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ization mechanism with instruments like school, public structure for child rearing...
The model is not a general equilibrium model: it does not present the parental consump-
tion behaviour, the human capital accumulation and the industrial structure. Traditionalists
and moderns exhibit the same human capital endowment: ht = hm = 1 constant for all t.
The exercise objective is to show that a cultural and demographic transition does appear
when the wage of modern parents increases and when the traditionalist culture is not too
coercitve. The coercitivness of a culture is measured by two parameters: i and ii   ij:
The rst calibration exercise considers that the traditionalist and the modern culture
have the same (low) intolerance (coercition): m = t = 1 and mm   mt = tt   tm = 10;
The cultural dynamic is simulated for wt = 1 and wm = f0:5; 1; 4; 10g : In other words,
permanent asymetric productivity shocks are simulated, only wm is a¤ected. Then it is
assumed that the labour market does not value in the same way the two kind of human
capital. When a positive permanent technological shok does appear, the wage gap between
moderns and traditionalists increases.
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Figure 1: Cultural Dynamics in Presence of Wage Gap Schocks
It appears that an increase in the modern wage level implies a higher proportion of
modern agents in the long run. Moreover transcritical bifurcation does appear: for low
levels of modern wages, there only exist two steady states qt = f0; 1g and only qt = 0 is
stable, for intermediary level of wm a third steady state appears, that steady state is the
only one to be stable. Finally, for very high values of wm; there only exists two steady states
qt = f0; 1g and only qt = 1 is stable.
An increase in wm has two main e¤ects: it changes the expected loss of modern and
traditionalist parents if their children do not adopt their own culture, and it increases the
modern parents income. A higher wm implies that to be modern is more enjoyable for
each people, then the intolerance of modern people increases whereas the intolerance of
traditionalist people decreases. Traditionalists tend to make more children with a smaller
socialization e¤ort. When the increase of wm is high, the traditionalists socialization e¤ort
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tends to zero, then their children are directly matched with a role agent. The moderns
tend to make less children with a higher socialization e¤ort because they are more intolerant
(V m rises). However, a higher wm means an higher income for modern parents, then they
tend to make more children with a higher socialization e¤ort. For a very high increase in wm,
that income e¤ect could dominate the intolerance e¤ect. Then the proportion of modern
agents in the long run positively depends on the level of wm and there exist some parametric
congurations where the modern culture is the only one that is stable in the long run.
The fertility transition is dened as a transition from a high births rate steady state
to a low births rate steady state. A su¢ ciently high increase in wm provokes a transition
from a steady state where traditionalists are in majority to a steady state where moderns
are in majority. The model shows that traditionalists exhibit a higher fertility rate than
the moderns. Then the cultural transition unambigously implies a fertility transition. A
transition from wm = 1 to wm = 10 can be represented by the following evolution of the
average total fertility rate:
Figure 2: Average Net Fertility with a Large Wage Gap Schock
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A second simulation exercise is implemented. The cultural intolerance of the traditionalist
group is now higher than the intolerance of the modern group, such that m < t and
mm   mt < tt   tm. No signicative cultural and demographic transition does appear
for wm = f0:5; 1; 4; 10g : It results from the decrease of the traditionalist sensibility to the
modern wage increase. If the traditionalist agents exhibit a very high cultural intolerance,
they are not sensible to the income improvement their child could enjoy if they become
modern. Then their socialization e¤ort does not necessary tend to zero when wm increases
and no signicative transition does appear. The transition will appear for very high values
of wm that will be more di¢ cult to reach.
However, for higher values of wm, the same result is obtained. It is just required that
wm goes from 1 to 22.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The model shows that a fertility transition could not appear without a cultural transition.
The apparition of a fertility transition is always the result of an interaction between an
economic and cultural evolution. Furthermore, a fertility transition can always appear in that
framework. Given the cultural structure of the population, a su¢ ciently large productivity
shock provokes a fertility transition. That productivity shock has to increase the wage gap
between the cultural groups such that the cultural deviation becomes more acceptable. As
a result, the apparition of productivity shocks is not a su¢ cient condition to undergo a
fertility transition. For very large shocks, the cultural deviation becomes an optimal choice
for a group and that group disappears in the long run.
That result already exists in the demographic litterature. Chesnai [1986] shows that the
increase in the human capital endowment provokes a decrease in the religious sentiment.
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That phenomenon implies a fall in the net fertility rates. Then a fall in the intensity of
religious sentiment does not appear as a necessary and su¢ cient condition to undergo a
demographic transition. It only appears as a necessary one.
Finally, the model predicts that two economically similar countries a¤ected by the same
technological shock will not experience the same fertility dynamics if their cultural structures
are di¤erent. A country with a more coercitive traditional culture will experience a lower
reduction in its fertility rate than a country with a less coercive traditional culture.
Gaisie [1996] shows that some Sub-Saharan African countries as Cameroon, Mali and
Nigeria do not achieve their demographic transition because of cultural pressures. These
countries experienced a fall in their children mortality rates and developed educational pol-
itics but do not signicantly reduce their fertility rates. That explanation is in line with
Mekonnen and Mekonnen [2002], Addai [1998] and Mekonnen [1998].
In conclusion, the model and its calibration exercise seem to conrm an argument of
many demographers: a fertility transition could appear only if the cultural structure of the
society can accept it. It shows that, if traditionalism is dened by a high births rate norm,
a low degree of coercition in the traditional group is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition
to undergo a fertility transition. A fertility transition is provoked by the co-existence of
favourable economic and cultural conditions. In that sense, the paper improves the existing
litterature on demographic economics by introducing a cultural background in an endogenous
fertility model. It does not explain the fertility behaviour changes by a pure human capital
argument or inversely by a simple exogenous change in the agents preferences. It proposes
a mechanism where the improvements in the human capital returns provokes a cultural
mutation allowing the implementation of a fertility transition.
Future research will have to endogenize the process of human capital accumulation. Then
18
the model could propose a specic explanation to the early development of developed eco-
nomics and the late development of other countries.
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Appendix 1
Common Values
ht = hm = 1
wt = 1
 = 30
 = 30
Fertility Norms (from Bairoch [1999])
N = 1
N = 4
First Exercise
mm = 20
mt = 10
tt = 20
tm = 10
m = t = 1
wm = f0:5; 1; 4; 10g
Second Exercise
mm = 20
mt = 10
tt = 40
tm = 10
20
m = 1
t = 3
wm = f0:5; 1; 4; 10; 22g
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